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The Fight over Reconstruction in New Orleans
James K. Hogue adds an important new perspective to the much-studied
topic of Reconstruction in Louisiana by considering the state's politics through
the lens of military history. Taking as his departure point the relative absence of
scholarship on Reconstruction as a military phenomenon, Hogue recasts the era
as a continuation of the Civil War in an irregular, intermittent, and sometimes
clandestine struggle (10).
This struggle pitted the Republican Party's coalition of African Americans,
white northern newcomers, and southern Unionists against Louisiana's white
ex-Confederates, who organized behind the Democratic Party. Republicans
wanted to create a racially egalitarian, free labor society whereas Democrats
wanted to preserve as much as they could of the antebellum racial hierarchy.
While this characterization of Reconstruction as a failed revolution resonates
with most scholarship written after the demise of the Dunning school's tragic era
account, Hogue breaks new ground in showing how military processes
contributed to the downfall of the Republicans and their plan for a new social
order.
Hogue organizes his argument around five New Orleans street battles that
occurred between 1865 and 1877. The incidents marked stages in the evolution
of counterrevolutionary tactics. In an assault that killed at least 38 Republican
convention delegates on July 30, 1866, anti-Republican whites, many of them
Confederate veterans, enacted the most visible manifestation of a much broader
pattern of vigilante violence across racial lines (51). Hogue fits the 1866 street
battle into a larger pattern of racial moments of truth that originated in slavery
and gained intensity after 1863, when African-American Union military service
1
Towers: Uncivil War: Five New Orleans Street Battles and the Rise and Fal
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2007
gave former slaves a fair fight with their white foes. The northern reaction to the
1866 violence helped Republicans obtain the necessary Congressional majorities
to pursue revolutionary change in the South. In Louisiana, General Phillip
Sheridan and Republican Governor Henry Clay Warmoth pursued radical
policies with the aid of a superior military organization capable of overawing Ku
Klux Klan vigilantes.
Counterrevolution entered its second phase in 1873 when white supremacist
Democrats abandoned ad hoc vigilantism in favor of better organized
paramilitary attacks on Republican power. William Pitt Kellogg, the Republican
claimant in that year's disputed gubernatorial election, used the bi-racial
Louisiana State Militia, headed by former Confederate General James
Longstreet, to fend off an armed attack by followers of his Democratic
challenger. Although victorious in the state capital, Republicans had been
weakened by vacillating federal support, factional infighting, and their inability
to make the Louisiana State Militia effective outside New Orleans. In open
alliance with Democratic candidates, white supremacist paramilitaries exploited
this vulnerability by driving Republicans out of rural parish governments. The
Colfax Massacre in Grant Parish, Reconstruction's deadliest battle, epitomized
this new combination of racialized politics and paramilitary violence.
Hogue's analysis of the Crescent City White League, a component of
Democrats' loosely organized paramilitary force, shows that its largest group of
volunteers had earlier belonged to the Confederacy's Washington Artillery, an
elite unit formed by New Orleans merchants and lawyers. The paramilitaries
reflected the larger dynamics of the state Democratic Party, in which planters,
professionals, and ex-Confederate officers led the mass of the state's white men
against any expansion of African-American political and social power.
In 1877 Democratic paramilitaries entered the final phase of
counter-revolution, a successful coup d'etat that toppled Republican government
in Louisiana and, as part of the settlement in the contested presidential election
of 1876, ended Reconstruction once and for all. Hogue interprets the street battle
of January 9 as an example of the modern coup in which small forces take
political power through attacks on key government facilities, such as the
legislative halls, courthouses, newspaper offices, and armories.
The book concludes by exploring Reconstruction's implications for the U.S.
military and state-run National Guards. Hogue argues that southern opposition to
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federal intervention combined with career soldiers' reluctance to re-engage
civilian politics to restrict the size of the U.S. army and increase the power of
state-run National Guards.
Hogue's argument is persuasive, based on impressive research, and full of
suggestive arguments about racial conflict and the place of Louisiana
Reconstruction in the broader pattern of nineteenth century political and military
history. If there is a flaw in Hogue's research model it lies in explaining what
social and ideological factors helped each side maintain cohesiveness over the
twelve-year span of Reconstruction. Hogue attributes the zeal of White Leaguers
to unrepentant white supremacist and Confederate sympathies. Republican
motives, especially those of Republican leaders like Kellogg and his
predecessors Henry Clay Warmoth and P.B.S. Pinchback, are harder to identify.
While Hogue eschews the Dunning school's blanket condemnations of
Republicans, he does see spoils as a primary influence. In contrast, Ted Tunnell's
recent biography of carpetbagger Marshall Twitchell, whose family was
murdered by White Leaguers not far from Grant Parish, describes at least one
northern-born Republican officeholder who risked a great deal for comparatively
little personal gain. Similarly, Rebecca Scott's comparative history of Louisiana
and Cuba brings out the complex play of forces that permitted or prevented
military and political mobilization by former slaves. Having a safe space to
organize politically and the economic resources to act free of employer coercion
greatly aided the foes of Reconstruction while the same factors circumscribed
the ability of black Louisianans, the largest constituency of radical
reconstruction, from achieving the same level of military readiness.
Although these perspectives might deepen the reach of Hogue's insights into
Louisiana politics, these same books could be faulted for their inattention to the
military perspective on state politics that Hogue provides. Not only is Uncivil
War a valuable addition to the study of Reconstruction, but it also enhances
historians' understanding of the coercive side of American politics and offers a
timely case study of past efforts at peacekeeping during an irregular civil war.
Frank Towers is an associate professor of history at the University of
Calgary. He is the author of The Urban South and the Coming of the Civil War
(2004).
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